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INTRODUCTION
The deadliest rail accident in Canada of the past century unfolded in the early hours of July 6, 2013. An unattended train of 73 carloads of crude oil from the Bakken shale formation in North Dakota, operated by the Montreal, Maine & Atlantic (MMA) Railway, ran away and then derailed, exploded and burned in the heart of the small Québec town of Lac-Mégantic. Forty-seven of the town's residents died in the ensuing inferno.
The Lac-Mégantic tragedy has been described as an incubated disaster, 1 an inevitable endpoint of a series of systemic failures on the part of the railway operator, but also on the part of railway safety regulators in Canada and the United States. Regulators on both sides of the border failed to respond to the safety implications of the dramatic increase in the transportation of crude oil by rail from 2010 onwards. These oversights were compounded by longer-standing failures to deal with well-recognized issues around railway tank car safety, and to establish and implement effective regulatory regimes for railway safety, particularly in relation to the transportation of dangerous goods. 2 The scale and significance of the tragedy prompted calls for a formal public inquiry into the disaster from survivors and town residents, 3 the Town of Lac-Mégantic itself 4 and neighbouring municipalities, 3. Jacques Gagnon, "Le Comité citoyen de la région du lac Mégantic demande une enquête publique sur le déraillement de Lac-Mégantic", online: <www.change.org/p/le-comité-citoyende-la-région-du-lac-mégantic-demande-une-enquête-publique-sur-le-déraillement-du-6-juillet-2013-à-lac-mégantic>. called into the tragedy. In doing so it explores the substantive and political rationales for establishing public inquiries into circumstances like Lac-Mégantic, and the reasons why the various investigations that have been undertaken by the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) and others into the disaster do not constitute an adequate substitute for a formal inquiry. The paper then employs a modified institutionalideological analytical framework 12 to examine the landscape, ideational, societal, and institutional factors that have worked against the calling of an inquiry. Finally, the paper discusses the implications of the decision not to call an inquiry in the Lac-Mégantic case for the role of inquiries into similar circumstances in the future.
I. THE RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC INQUIRIES
The federal Inquiries Act 13 sets no specific criteria around when public inquiries should be called. Rather the Act merely states that the Governor-in-Council (i.e. federal Cabinet) may cause an inquiry to be made into and concerning "any matter connected with the good government of Canada or the conduct of any part of the public business thereof," wherever it would be "expedient" do to so.
14 Similarly the Ontario Public Inquiries Act 15 permits the Lieutenant Governor in Council to establish a commission to inquire into any matter considered to be in the public interest. 16 Given the wide discretion given to cabinets in the establishment of inquiries, the decision to establish an inquiry is essentially political. 17 In practice, a number of factors drive the establishment of inquiries. These include the scale of the impacts of the events involved in terms (2018) Establishing an inquiry involves a conscious decision to initiate a process outside of the normal structures and machinery of government. This choice may be a function of the need to investigate the operation of those structures themselves or the adequacy of existing legislation and policy. An inquiry may also have much greater freedom to engage with new ideas and perspectives than may be possible within the established institutions and processes of government. Public confidence in inquiries is closely related to their degree of independence from government, in combination with their investigative powers to "get to the bottom" of a problem. 23 In some cases, the establishment of an inquiry can provide a government with the means of deflecting immediate opposition party, media and public criticism of its handling of an event and the decisions leading up to it. 24 Ontario Premier Harris' decision to call an inquiry into the May 2000 Walkerton water contamination disaster is a leading example of such a strategy. The weeks leading up to the announcement of an inquiry were defined by intense pressures from both 18 legislative opposition parties and the media around the potential linkages between the Government's "common sense revolution"-inspired strategy of environmental deregulation and the disaster. 25 At the same time, many authors have highlighted the risks associated with such strategies, particularly the loss of control of the information given to the public and the way it is expressed. The release of information through an inquiry process may stir up further controversies.
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Once established, inquiries, particularly those following major disasters or other perceived regulatory or policy failures, are seen to have three major functions: truth seeking; justice seeking; and policy seeking. 27 Truth seeking is essentially the fact-finding dimension of an inquiry. An inquiry uses its investigative powers, including the ability to access documents and records, and compel testimony, under oath, from the key participants in the events under investigation, to establish the facts around the event, and an understanding of the roles, actions and motivations of the individuals and organizations involved. Part I of the Walkerton Inquiry and its resulting report 28 are widely regarded as providing excellent examples of these functions. leading example of these types of work. In that case, the recommendations 31 of the inquiry regarding the prevention of future drinking water contamination incidents were accepted by the government and legislative opposition parties, 32 and ultimately provided the basis for new legislation and institutional arrangements around drinking water safety and the protection of sources of drinking water. 33 Salter, 34 following Thibault and Walker, 35 links the justice-seeking function of inquiries closely to their truth-seeking function. Justice is seen to be fulfilled through the public identification of wrongdoing, and the assignment of blame to the individuals responsible, along with the resolution of disputes and conflicts among interest groups. Although these are important aspects of the justice-seeking function of inquiries, they may not fully capture the contributions that inquiries can make in providing justice to victims and survivors, particularly where major losses of life have been occurred.
Inquiries can play a significant role in the processes of grieving and healing within the affected communities. These functions flow from several dimensions of the inquiry process. Implicit in the decision on the part of a government to convene an inquiry is an acknowledgement of the significance of an event and its consequences for the affected communities. The Ontario Government of Premier Dalton McGuinty's decision to call an inquiry into the 2012 Algo Centre Mall collapse is a good example of such an acknowledgement. Beyond the loss of the life of two innocent bystanders, the mall played a central role in the life of the community of Elliot Lake and the surrounding area, and its loss had major impacts on the community. 36 Secondly, the inquiry process can provide victims and members of the affected community with opportunities to tell the stories of their own experiences and losses through a disaster on the formal record.
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In the case of the Walkerton Inquiry, for example, Justice O'Connor has noted that "[i]t was very important in this town, at this time, to have a judge listen to their story." 38 To this end, the first public meeting of the inquiry focussed on the commissioner hearing directly from the victims about the impact of the disaster on their lives. This is again a formal acknowledgement of the significance of the event, and its impacts on individuals and community members. Finally, an inquiry process can contribute to bringing closure to the events under study. As noted earlier, the roles of those responsible are recorded on the public record, and pathways to prevent similar disasters in the future are identified. The identification and implementation of these types of measures can be a very important consideration in the mind of survivors and the families of victims. 39 For the purposes of this paper, the justice-seeking function of inquiries is defined to include these wider functions related to the acknowledgement of the significance of events, and their potential contributions to grieving, healing and closure in the affected communities.
II. LAC-MÉGANTIC: A SERIES OF QUASI-INQUIRIES
In the case of Lac-Mégantic, there have been several formal and informal investigations of the disaster, but no formal inquiry has ever been mandated under the Inquiries Act, or under the inquiries provisions of the Railway Safety Act. 40 The studies that have taken place include the investigation of the accident by the TSB, two studies by The House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (SCOTIC) undertook two studies of the transportation safety regime. The first was completed towards the end of the Conservative Government in March 2015 42 and then an "update," focussed specifically on rail safety, was completed in June 2016, 43 following the October 2015 election. However, neither study focussed specifically on the Lac-Mégantic disaster. Rather, the disaster was treated as context for wider studies of marine, air and rail safety undertaken by the Committee. The studies did not include testimony from the principal actors involved in the tragedy, representatives of the victims and survivors, or academic or non-governmental researchers studying the railway safety regime. As is typically the case with parliamentary committee's inquiries, 44 the depth and scope of the Committee's work was also constrained by partisan considerations, given the Conservative and then Liberal governments' majorities on the 41 Committee and the apparent desire of both governments to avoid a specific study of the Lac-Mégantic disaster. That said, both reports highlighted concerns about Transport Canada's approach to safety regulation, particularly the role of the Safety Management System (SMS) regime versus direct inspection and regulation. Some Committee members did conduct a site visit to Lac-Mégantic as part of the June 2016 study and met informally with community members and officials.
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The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) undertook a number of studies on the railway safety regime in the aftermath of the disaster, 46 but had no capacity to compel testimony or demand access to documents and information other than those that can be requested under the Access to Information Act. The Centre, working in conjunction with the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, hosted a conference on the Lac-Mégantic disaster in December 2016, 47 with the specific intent of giving voice to victims and survivors, as well as media, academic and non-governmental researchers working on railway safety, but the conference made no pretence of being a substitute for the profile and legitimacy of a formal inquiry.
A number of media outlets have followed the Lac-Mégantic story closely since the time of the disaster, including the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, CBC/Radio-Canada, the National Observer, and DeSmog Canada. However, all were also subject to the same constraints as those suffered by the CCPA in terms of status, legitimacy, and ability to compel participants in the events surrounding the disaster to speak on or off the record. Similarly, media outlets' access to documents and information was limited to what can be obtained under the Access to Information Act. That legislation limits access to third party documents, like railway SMS plans, to situations where those third parties agree to access. 48. Access to Information Act, RCS 1985, c A-1, s 20 of the Act does permit the release of thirdparty information held by the government if it is determined to be in the public interest to do so s 20(6). Transport Canada has so far declined to invoke this provision in relation to railway SMS plans.
Perhaps the closest thing to a formal inquiry has been the work of the TSB. The Board conducted an extensive investigation into the LacMégantic disaster and the events leading up to the disaster. In its report the Board identified a series of underlying failures on the part of the MMA Railway and Transport Canada, and made extensive recommendations regarding the railway safety regime. 49 The Board was established in 1990
50 as a form of permanent inquiry into transportation (rail, marine and air) occurrences.
The TSB has substantial investigative authority with respect to transportation accidents and occurrences. Where accidents or incidents do occur, the Board has the ability to interview witnesses as well as company and government personnel, and examine company, vehicle, government and other records. Although the TSB may grant "observer" status to persons with a direct interest in the subject matter of the investigation, and allow them to "attend" investigations, the process involves no public testimony, or cross-examination of principals in events, as would occur in a formal inquiry. The absence of a public dimension to the Board's processes has been a point of criticism in relation to other transportation disasters involving the loss of life.
51
When it reports on accidents the TSB does not assign fault, 52 a further point of weakness relative to a formal inquiry. The Board can make recommendations to the Government of Canada based on its findings, but cannot compel the government or operators to comply with these recommendations.
The reports of the Québec Coroner dealt with the circumstances of the death of the individual victims of the Lac-Mégantic disaster, and made recommendations for the strengthening of the railway safety regime, and endorsing the recommendations already made by the TSB. 53 Finally, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) published a study of the railway safety regime in the immediate aftermath of the 49 Lac-Mégantic disaster. 54 The Commissioner for Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD), a branch of the OAG, had completed a related study on the transportation of dangerous goods regime in 2011. 55 Like the TSB, the OAG and CESD have substantial powers to access government records and documents, but they cannot compel public testimony, and their ability to access to third party documents, like SMS plans, is limited. A review of the Railway Safety Act was announced by Transport Canada in April 2017, 56 although the process for the review has yet to be fully determined, and it is not intended to serve as an inquiry into the specific events at Lac-Mégantic.
A class action lawsuit was initiated against 25 companies connected to the disaster, including the MMA Railway and its parent company Rail World, CP Rail, Irving Oil (the intended recipient of the shipment involved in the disaster), and World Fuel Services (the shipper), and the federal government, on behalf of the victims and survivors of the disaster. 57 However, except for CP Rail, 58 the suit has been settled with a $460-million fund being established for the victims. As a result, there will be no trial, no testimony, and no release of documents as a result of the litigation. The Province of Québec has also launched a so far unresolved, civil lawsuit against CP Rail and several other firms involved in the disaster, to recover clean-up costs. been criticized for its very limited scope, especially the strategy of targeting operational level staff, as opposed to focussing on senior management and wider systemic issues. 61 More broadly, the shortcomings of criminal investigations in providing full understandings of the events leading up to disasters like Lac-Mégantic are well described. 62 Although many of the organizations and individuals pursuing investigations into the Lac-Mégantic disaster have done outstanding work, they have each been subject to significant limitations, and therefore cannot stand as substitutes for the truth-seeking, policy evaluation and formulation and justice-seeking functions of a formal inquiry. With respect to truth seeking, none of the investigations has involved public testimony, under oath, on the part of the principals involved in the accident, to say nothing of cross-examination of their testimony by commission council, or council representing other participants in an inquiry, such as the victims. All of the efforts have been subject to limitations in terms of their ability to access information, particularly from outside of government. As a result, none has been able to provide a complete picture and analysis of the events leading up to the disaster. Rather, the understanding of these events remains fragmentary and incomplete.
The work of the TSB, Auditor General as well as CESD, SCOTIC, CCPA, and others mean that many aspects of the policy evaluation and formulation functions that might have been carried out by an inquiry have been addressed in part. However, these efforts have also been fragmented and are only partially completed. There has been no opportunity or structure for the integration of their efforts, and the dynamic engagement of the expertise of different institutions, organizations and individuals as occurred, for example, in Part II of the Walkerton Inquiry. public record, provided the kinds of conclusive assignment of responsibility needed to begin to bring closure to the disaster, or established a definitive set of recommendations on how to prevent similar tragedies in the future.
III. WHY WAS THERE NO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE LAC-MÉGANTIC DISASTER?
Calls for a formal inquiry into the Lac-Mégantic disaster emerged from a number of sources in the aftermath of the event. These included groups representing victims and survivors, 63 the Town of Lac-Mégantic itself 64 and the neighbouring Municipality of Nantes, the CCPA, 65 and the federal New Democratic Party (NDP) 66 and Green Party, 67 and the Parti Québécois opposition in Québec. 68 Despite the scale and significance of the disaster, Stephen Harper's Conservative Government was steadfast in its refusals to call a formal inquiry into the disaster. 69 The Justin Trudeau's Liberals, for their part, were silent on the matter in the 2015 election campaign, and beyond advancing a scheduled review of the Railway Safety Act, have made no moves to conduct a formal inquiry into Lac-Mégantic disaster. This paper takes a modified institutional-ideological approach 70 to assessing the reasons why there has been no inquiry. Under this model, four major categories of variables are considered in understanding the public policy choices made by governments. The four categories are: 1) the physical, economic and environmental landscape within which 63 . See Gagnon, supra note 3. 64. City of Lac-Mégantic, supra note 4. 65. CCPA, Press Release, "Study Calls for Independent Inquiry into Lac-Mégantic Disaster" (20 January 2015).
66. The Canadian Press, "Mulcair Pledges Inquiry into Lac-Mégantic Disaster, Rail Safety", CBC. ca (16 October 2015) , online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/mulcair-visits-lac-Mégantic-in-ndp-campaign-stop-1.3274610>.
67. Green Party of Canada, supra note 6. 68. CNW/Telbec, supra note 7. The Parti Québécois had formed the Government of Quebec at the time of the disaster, but was defeated in the 2014 provincial election.
69. Seglins, supra note 10. Provisions of the federal Inquiries Act, supra note 13 may preclude an inquiry when the subject matter is regulated by a special law, potentially such as that establishing the TSB (Ratushny, supra note 17 at 124), but that rationale for not calling an inquiry was never invoked by the federal government in the Lac-Mégantic case.
70. See Winfield, Blue-Green Province, supra note 12 at 3-9. See also Doern & Toner, supra note 12; Hessing, Howlett & Summerville, supra note 12 at 105-06. (2018) 48 R.G.D. 131-154 decisions have occurred; 2) underlying norms and assumptions about the role of government, and appropriate policy paradigms in the area under consideration; 3) non-state/societal actors and influences, including major interest groups, public opinion and the media; and 4) institutional structures, including the formal location of decisionmaking authority, and legal and constitutional status of governmental actors, and the interests of major institutional actors in the decisionmaking process.
Landscape and institutional factors are generally regarded as relatively fixed, while the roles of non-state actors and underlying norms and assumptions are typically more fluid. Significant changes in landscape conditions or in institutional structures can substantially alter the power relations among institutional and societal actors and result in major changes in policy direction. 71 More generally, significant shifts in policy are understood to be driven by convergences of circumstances, and societal and ideational factors, which lead to the displacement of normally dominant governing and policy paradigms.
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IV. LANDSCAPE CONSIDERATIONS
A defining context for the July 2013 events in Lac-Mégantic was the dramatic growth in the transportation of crude oil by rail in North America from the end of 2010 onwards. The shift in oil transportation patterns was driven by a multifold growth in unconventional, specifically "fracked" or "light-tight" oil production in the United States. Production of these types of oil grew in the US from less than 500,000 barrels per day in 2008 73 to 2.5 million barrels per day in 2013. The process was driven by technological developments in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, allowing their widespread economic use. The sudden growth in unconventional oil production, in many cases in locations not well connected to existing North American pipeline networks, led to an increased reliance on rail tank cars to move crude oil to refineries or tidewater for export. The train involved in the Lac-Mégantic disaster was itself carrying crude oil from the Bakken shale formation in North Dakota to the Irving Oil facility in Saint John, New Brunswick.
Effectively, the rapid growth in unconventional oil production outstripped both the transportation and regulatory infrastructure on both sides of the Canada-US border. Several studies on the LacMégantic disaster have highlighted Transport Canada's failure to undertake any form of assessment of the risks associated with the crude-to-rail phenomena, particularly in the context of well-known safety issues regarding older DOT-111-type tank cars, which were being brought back into service to meet the need to transport oil. 75 The increase in unconventional oil production was widely seen as contributing to North American energy security. In Canada, the transportation of crude oil by rail was also emerging as a way of overcoming pipeline route and capacity limitations on oil sands production in Alberta. 76 Given the centrality of the expansion of oil sands production to the Harper Government's overall economic strategy, 77 there was no desire on part of the federal government to interfere with these developments. Moreover, an inquiry could lead to questions around the government's handling of the environmental and safety risks associated with the movement of oil by rail. An inquiry might also lead to recommendations for a strengthening of regulatory regimes around these practices. The potential for an inquiry to lead to such outcomes likely made it an unwelcome option for the federal government, and the fossil fuel and railway industries. 
V. IDEAS AND NORMS
One of the striking factors which emerged from the Lac-Mégantic disaster was the depth of commitment within the federal public service to meta-regulatory regimes 78 like the Transport Canada SMS system, in situations where the federal government is the primary safety and health regulator of economic activities. These types of regimes rely on requirements that regulated entities develop internal management systems to achieve the needed health and safety outcomes. Federal regulatory oversight is then focussed on the development and implementation of these management systems, rather than direct oversight of regulated activities. Rail, marine and air transport safety are highprofile examples of such situations on the part of Transport Canada. Similar regimes are employed, for example, by Health Canada with respect to food and drug safety.
An inquiry would have been almost certain to involve discussions about the effectiveness of these types of regulatory models and potential recommendations about their future role. As it has been, the TSB's recent investigations, including the Lac-Mégantic investigation, 79 the OAG's audits of transportation safety 80 and the SCOTIC's studies 81 have raised serious questions about the appropriateness of the balance being struck by Transport Canada between direct regulatory oversight activities versus paper oversight through the review of SMS plans and reports. An inquiry would have likely deepened these questions, and perhaps even challenged the wisdom of the underlying regulatory model.
A second consideration relates to the role of railways in Canada as economic development infrastructure, and their close relationship to the Canadian federal government. One, the Canadian Pacific Railway (now CP Rail), was the federal government's central instrument for the colonization of the Canadian west, and another, Canadian National Railways, was a federally owned Crown corporation until 1995. These relationships have produced a high degree of deference on the part of the federal government towards the railways, and expectations of high levels of autonomy in the railway sector.
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VI. SOCIETAL ACTORS AND FACTORS
The strongest calls for inquiry came from victims and survivors' groups within the community of Lac-Mégantic itself. These calls were endorsed by the Town of Lac-Mégantic, and the neighbouring Municipality of Nantes. 83 The community's calls for an inquiry were supported by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, members of the academic community, 84 and some federal and Québec opposition parties. The Union des municipalités du Québec, for its part, called for strengthened oversight of railway safety, but did not specifically call for an inquiry. Railway unions, and municipalities outside of Québec that saw themselves as being at risk for accidents like that in LacMégantic due to the location of major freight rail corridors, 85 took similar positions. The disaster and a series of similar, non-fatal incidents involving the transportation of oil by rail 86 initially drew substantial media attention in Québec and across Canada.
Although successful in garnering some political support for an inquiry, the victims' groups were not able to generate the kind of intense mobilization of demands for a formal inquiry that occurred in the Walkerton case. Lac-Mégantic's location, a two-to three-hour drive from the major media centres in Montréal and Québec City, and even more distant from major anglophone media centres in Toronto and Ottawa, made sustaining media interest challenging. In addition, in the Walkerton case, the victims' groups benefitted from the early engagement of the Toronto-based Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA), a legal aid clinic specializing in environmental and social justice law. CELA assisted the community in organizing its calls for an inquiry and ultimately represented the main victims' group in the inquiry. 87 There were no comparable supports available to the LacMégantic victims.
Although the Canada's major railways, including Canadian National Railways and the Canadian Pacific Railway, never took public positions on the issue of a formal inquiry into the Lac-Mégantic disaster, it is unlikely that they would have supported such a development. An inquiry, particularly one with a mandate to consider the contributions of the underlying policy and regulatory framework for railway safety to the disaster, could lead to lines of inquiry with respect to Transport Canada's relationship with other railway operators, and safety and operating practices within those railways. These types of questions about the systemic origins of the accident would likely have been strongly supported by union and public participants in an inquiry. In addition to the revelation of potentially embarrassing details and incidents regarding the railways practices and relationship with Transport Canada, an inquiry could make recommendations for significant changes to the existing regulatory regime, one which the railways strongly support. 88 Such recommendations could go beyond those made by SCOTIC, the TSB and OAG in terms of changes to the existing regulatory and institutional framework around railway safety. Substantial constituencies from among those engaged in an inquiry could be mobilized in their support, as happened with the recommendations from Part II of the Walkerton Inquiry. 89 
VII. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND ACTORS
It is likely that the strongest opposition to a formal inquiry came from within the Government of Canada itself. As Canada's railway safety regulator, and more specifically the regulator of the activities of the MMA Railway, the Canadian Department of Transport's role in the disaster was an immediate focus of media and political attention. 90 The disaster was widely described as a catastrophic regulatory failure on the part of the Department. 91 Behind this were long-standing questions regarding the Department's approaches to railway safety and its relationships with the railway companies whose activities it was supposed to oversee. 92 Both the Department's specific interactions with the MMA Railway, and its wider approach to its safety regulatory responsibilities would have been an inevitable focus of intense-and from the Department's perspective unwelcome-public scrutiny before an inquiry. An inquiry could also make recommendations for major changes to the institutional and regulatory arrangements around railway safety, potentially significantly affecting the Department's role and mandate. In these circumstances, the Department is likely to have opposed an inquiry strongly, arguing that the TSB's investigations of the incident were sufficient.
The TSB and OAG for their part were likely neutral on the issue of a formal inquiry. They certainly would have been called upon to provide expert testimony and participate in the formulation of recommendations, and may have welcomed the possibility of public testimony, under oath, on the part of the principals involved. Other federal agencies and departments were also likely neutral on the question of an inquiry, given its likely overwhelming focus on the role of Transport Canada. However, there may have been concerns about the possibility of lines of inquiry into reliance of other federal agencies, particularly Health Canada, on meta-regulatory regimes, 93 similar in concept to the Transport Canada SMS-based system, and focussed on the establishment internal management systems by regulated firms, as opposed to direct regulatory oversight.
The Government of Québec, for its part remained silent on the issue of a formal inquiry into the disaster. The provincial government had provided support to the MMA Railway, including a 13% equity investment by the Québec pension fund, the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec. The MMA was seen as important to supporting economic activity in the region. The situation at the political level was even less favourable to the concept of a formal inquiry. As the government of the day when the Lac-Mégantic disaster occurred, Stephen's Harper's Conservatives were likely to want to minimize the extent to which blame might be attributed to their administration. Although inquiries may be called to deflect immediate criticism of the government's handling of a specific situation or events, they do carry the potential for substantial political risks further on. 95 These can emerge through damaging testimony from principals and other witnesses in terms of specific decisions and actions, particularly on the part of actors at the political level. Current and past ministers, and even prime ministers, may be called to testify themselves, a situation of very high political risk, given the potential for media and public perceptions of implications of suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of the inquiry. Reliance on the TSB process, in which there could be no public testimony or involvement by political actors, and which was established as a form of standing inquiry anyway, would avoid at least some of these risks.
In the case of the Harper Government these concerns were likely reinforced by the presence of a number of senior ministers who had served as ministers in the Ontario Government of Premier Mike Harris in the 1990s. This group included Finance Minister Jim Flaherty, Treasury Board President Tony Clement, and Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird. All would have been very aware of the impact of the Walkerton Inquiry on the political fortunes of the Harris Government. 96 The Walkerton disaster and testimony by the Premier and several ministers at the inquiry, as well as its damaging findings, were widely seen as major factors behind the ultimate resignation of Premier Harris, and the Ontario Progressive Conservative's loss of the 2003 provincial election to Dalton McGuinty's Liberals. The prospects for an inquiry were further dimmed by the consideration that the Member of Parliament for the Lac-Mégantic area at the time of disaster, Christian Paradis, who was the Minister of Industry, declined to support the community petition demanding an inquiry.
Moreover, unlike the situation leading up to the establishment of the Walkerton Inquiry, where the Ontario Liberals and NDP were united in their calls for an inquiry, the parliamentary opposition was far less 95. Ratushny, supra note 17 at 105-06; Salter, "The Complex Relationship", supra note 26. 96. Johns, "The Walkerton Inquiry and Policy Change", supra note 25 at 222-23; Winfield, Blue-Green Province, supra note 12 at 129-34. united in its stance on the need for an inquiry into the Lac-Mégantic disaster. Interim Liberal leader Bob Rae was strongly critical of efforts by the NDP to point to the possibility of systemic failures behind the disaster from the outset. 97 As the architects of the SMS-based regulatory regime, through the 1999 amendments to the Railway Safety Act made under then Liberal Transport Minister David Collenette, the Liberal opposition may also have had reasons to be unenthusiastic about an in-depth investigation of the regime, likely including its origins and implementation prior to the 2006 federal election. The 2015 Liberal election platform was noticeably silent on the issue of an inquiry and on railway safety generally.
VIII. SUMMARY
The establishment of a formal inquiry effectively changes the institutional landscape around a public policy issue, introducing a new and potentially disruptive, if temporary, actor into the process. 98 Existing institutions and dominant societal interests tend to have strong reasons to resist the establishment of inquiries for those reasons alone. In the case of Lac-Mégantic, Transport Canada and the major railways were strongly invested in the existing regulatory regime, and had little interest in setting in motion processes that might lead to major changes in the existing governing and policy paradigms around railway safety.
Beyond this there was strong opposition at political level with the federal government, particularly in light of the experience of key figures in the Harper Government with the Walkerton Inquiry while in government in Ontario. There was also a secondary consideration of a desire not to interfere with the role of crude-to-rail in the North American unconventional oil boom, including the expansion of the Canadian oil sands. The split among the major federal opposition parties, with the NDP and Greens supporting an inquiry, but the Liberals at best silent on the matter, further weakened the prospects for an inquiry. The silence of the Government of Québec had a similar impact. Against these factors, the victims of the disaster had little hope of success in their quest for an inquiry. 98. Ratushny, supra note 17 at 17.
